11. Episodic Memory, Vicarious Learning, and Gossip<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Keven, N. (in press). In A. Sant\u2019Anna, and C. Craver (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Memory<\/em>. Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Forthcoming<\/p>\n\n\n\n Remembering is often viewed as a solitary activity that serves individual cognitive needs. However, in practice, people frequently share their memories with others, and this act of memory sharing likely serves important social functions. This chapter argues that shared memories support vicarious learning\u2014the process of learning from others\u2019 past experiences, including their successes and mistakes, without direct exposure. While vicarious learning operates across various domains, it plays a particularly significant role in social life. Through shared memories\u2014especially those involving absent third parties, or gossip\u2014people learn about group norms and the consequences of violating them. This perspective highlights that memory is not only a tool for individual reasoning but also a socially embedded process. Acts of remembering are often shaped by the values, expectations, and shared concerns of the social groups to which individuals belong.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n<\/details>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n 10. What is Narrativity?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Keven, N. (2024). Ratio<\/em>, 37(2\u20133)<\/em>, 204\u2013214.<\/p>\n\n\n\n PDF<\/a> \u00b7 DOI<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n In recent years, narrative accounts of the self have gained increasing attention. It is widely accepted that humans are storytelling creatures, that stories shape our self-conception, and that we fail to be agents without a narrative framework. While there is less agreement on what constitutes a narrative, it is generally understood to be more than a chronological listing of life events; it is also an account of the explanatory relationships among these events\u2014a story of how events lead to other events. However, specifying the nature of this explanatory relationship has proven difficult. As critics have pointed out, narrativists often resort to simplistic notions of narrative when faced with criticism. The concept of narrative explanation needs to be elaborated in a way that is both substantive enough to exclude trivial behaviours from being considered narratives and nonrestrictive enough to accommodate ordinary lives that may not be particularly story-like. In this paper, I review existing accounts of narrative explanation and propose a teleological account, according to which narratives consist of goal-directed explanations of a sequence of events. I argue that a teleological account of narrative explanation can be a fruitful way to clarify the concept of \u201cnarrative\u201d in the context of the narrative self by addressing the most common objections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n<\/details>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n 9. Can Episodic Memory Deter Cheating and Promote Altruism?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Keven, N. (2024). Synthese<\/em>, 203(5<\/em>), 132.<\/p>\n\n\n\n PDF<\/a> \u00b7 DOI<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n Episodic memory gives us the ability to mentally travel back in time to revisit and relive past experiences. In recent years, there has been an increased interest in the function of episodic memory. According to the orthodox view, episodic memory should be considered a part of a constructive system that simulates the future for sophisticated foresight and flexible planning. In this paper, I offer a novel alternative view. I argue that episodic memory provides invaluable information about the past behavior of others, allowing us to identify reliable and trustworthy partners while avoiding dealing with cheaters. Theoretical models demonstrate that cooperation in groups can be maintained if potential partners use information about an individual\u2019s past behavior to guide their behavior toward that individual. In these reputation-based models of human cooperation, individuals with a history of cheating are ostracized, whereas those with a history of cooperative behavior flourish. Against this theoretical background, it is possible to see a function of episodic memory in facilitating information exchange about others, helping group members make effective partner choices, and avoiding the risk of interacting with cheaters. If correct, episodic memory may have played a significant role in the evolution of human cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n<\/details>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n 8. What does it take to remember episodically?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Keven, N. (2022) In Andr\u00e9 Sant\u2019Anna, Christopher Jude McCarroll, and Kourken Michaelian (Eds.), Current Controversies In Phi<\/em>losophy of Memory. <\/em>Routledge<\/p>\n\n\n\n PDF<\/a> \u00b7 DOI<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n This chapter asks what distinguishes episodic memory from the forms of memory found in non-human animals. It defends a kind-sceptical view by distinguishing snapshot-like event memories, which preserve perceptual information about changes in the environment, from episodic memories, which bind otherwise scattered events into coherent episodes through temporal, causal, and teleological inference. Existing evidence suggests that animals can retain and retrieve perceptual information, but does not show that they can reconstruct past experiences through these forms of inference. Episodic memory, on this account, is not merely memory for what happened, where, and when, but a distinctively organized form of remembering in which events are temporally ordered, causally connected, and goal-directed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n<\/details>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n 7. Let\u2019s Call a Memory a Memory, But What Kind?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Keven, N. (2019). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 42, E260.<\/p>\n\n\n\n PDF<\/a> \u00b7 DOI<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Hoerl & McCormack argue that animals cannot represent past situations and subsume animals\u2019 memory-like representations within a model of the world. I suggest calling these memory-like representations as what they are without beating around the bush. I refer to them as event memories and explain how they are different from episodic memory and how they can guide action in animal cognition.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n 6. Narrative Construction is Intact in Episodic Amnesia<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Keven, N., Kurczek, J., Rosenbaum, R. S. & Craver, C. (2018). Neuropsychologia<\/em>, 110<\/em>, 104-112.<\/p>\n\n\n\n PDF<\/a> \u00b7 DOI<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Autobiographical remembering and future imagining overlap in their underlying psychological and neurological mechanisms. The hippocampus and surrounding regions within the medial temporal lobes (MTL), known for their role in forming and maintaining autobiographical episodic memories, are also thought to play an essential role in fictitious and future constructions. Amnesic individuals with bilateral hippocampal damage cannot reconstruct their past personal experiences and also have severe deficits in the ability to construct coherent fictitious or future narratives. However, it is not known whether this impairment reflects a failure to generate details from autobiographical episodic memory to populate personal narratives or an inability to bind such details into coherent narratives. We show that four individuals with hippocampal damage and episodic amnesia can construct narratives when the relevant details of the story are provided in a picture book and that their narratives maintain overall coherence on several measures. These findings indicate that individuals with hippocampal damage can bind details into coherent narratives when details are available to them. We conclude that the hippocampal system instead likely plays a role in the generation of details from which narratives are constructed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n<\/details>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n 5. Carving Event and Episodic Memory at Their Joints<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Keven, N. (2018). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 41, E19.<\/p>\n\n\n\n PDF<\/a> \u00b7 DOI<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Mahr & Csibra (M&C) argue that event and episodic memories share the same scenario construction process. I think this way of carving up the distinction throws the baby out with the bathwater. If there is a substantive difference between event and episodic memory, it is based on a difference in the construction process and how they are organized, respectively.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n<\/details>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n 4. Neonatal Imitation in Context: Sensory-Motor Development in the Perinatal Period<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Keven, N., & Akins, K. A. (2017). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 40,<\/em> E381.<\/p>\n\n\n\n PDF<\/a> \u00b7 DOI<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n More than 35 years ago, Meltzoff and Moore (1977) published their famous article, \u201cImitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates.\u201d Their central conclusion, that neonates can imitate, was and continues to be controversial. Here, we focus on an often- neglected aspect of this debate, namely, neonatal spontaneous behaviors themselves. We present a case study of a paradigmatic orofacial \u201cgesture,\u201d namely tongue protrusion and retraction (TP\/R). Against the background of new research on mammalian aerodigestive development, we ask: How does the human aerodigestive system develop, and what role does TP\/R play in the neonate\u2019s emerging system of aerodigestion? We show that mammalian aerodigestion develops in two phases: (1) from the onset of isolated orofacial movements in utero to the postnatal mastery of suckling at 4 months after birth; and (2) thereafter, from preparation to the mastery of mastication and deglutition of solid foods. Like other orofacial stereotypies, TP\/R emerges in the first phase and vanishes prior to the second. Based upon recent advances in activity-driven early neural development, we suggest a sequence of three developmental events in which TP\/R might participate: the acquisition of tongue control, the integration of the central pattern generator (CPG) for TP\/R with other aerodigestive CPGs, and the formation of connections within the cortical maps of S1 and M1. If correct, orofacial stereotypies are crucial to the maturation of aerodigestion in the neonatal period but also unlikely to co-occur with imitative behavior.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n<\/details>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n 3. Beyond Neonatal Imitation: Aerodigestive Stereotypies, Speech Development and Social Interaction in the Extended Perinatal Period<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Keven, N., & Akins, K. A. (2017). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 40<\/em>, E403.<\/p>\n\n\n\n PDF<\/a> \u00b7 DOI<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n In our target article, we argued that the positive results of neonatal imitation are likely to be by-products of normal aerodigestive development. Our hypothesis elicited various responses on the role of social interaction in infancy, the methodological issues about imitation experiments, and the relation between the aerodigestive theory and the development of speech. Here we respond to the commentaries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n<\/details>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n 2. Moral Judgment in Episodic Amnesia<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Craver, C. F., Keven, N., Kwan, D., Kurczek, J., Duff, M. C., & Rosenbaum, R. S. (2016). Hippocampus, 26(8)<\/em>, 975\u2013979. <\/p>\n\n\n\n PDF<\/a> \u00b7 DOI<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n To investigate the role of episodic thought about the past and future in moral judgment, we administered a well-established moral judgment battery to individuals with hippocampal damage and deficits in episodic thought (insert Greene et al. 2001). Healthy controls select deontological answers in high-conflict moral scenarios more frequently when they vividly imagine themselves in the scenarios than when they imagine scenarios abstractly, at some personal remove. If this bias is mediated by episodic thought, individuals with deficits in episodic thought should not exhibit this effect. We report that individuals with deficits in episodic memory and future thought make moral judgments and exhibit the biasing effect of vivid, personal imaginings on moral judgment. These results strongly suggest that the biasing effect of vivid personal imagining on moral judgment is not due to episodic thought about the past and future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n<\/details>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n 1. Events, Narratives and Memory<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Keven, N. (2016). Synthese, 193(8)<\/em>, 2497\u20132517.<\/p>\n\n\n\n PDF<\/a> \u00b7 DOI<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n To investigate the role of episodic thought about the past and future in moral judgment, we administered a well-established moral judgment battery to individuals with hippocampal damage and deficits in episodic thought (insert Greene et al. 2001). Healthy controls select deontological answers in high-conflict moral scenarios more frequently when they vividly imagine themselves in the scenarios than when they imagine scenarios abstractly, at some personal remove. If this bias is mediated by episodic thought, individuals with deficits in episodic thought should not exhibit this effect. We report that individuals with deficits in episodic memory and future thought make moral judgments and exhibit the biasing effect of vivid, personal imaginings on moral judgment. These results strongly suggest that the biasing effect of vivid personal imagining on moral judgment is not due to episodic thought about the past and future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n<\/details>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" 11. Episodic Memory, Vicarious Learning, and Gossip Keven, N. (in press). In A. Sant\u2019Anna, and C. Craver (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Oxford University Press. Forthcoming 10. What is Narrativity? Keven, N. (2024). Ratio, 37(2\u20133), 204\u2013214. PDF \u00b7 DOI 9. Can Episodic Memory Deter Cheating and Promote Altruism? Keven, N. (2024). Synthese,… Continue reading Publications<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-40","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sci-phi.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/40","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sci-phi.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sci-phi.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sci-phi.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sci-phi.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=40"}],"version-history":[{"count":43,"href":"https:\/\/sci-phi.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/40\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":217,"href":"https:\/\/sci-phi.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/40\/revisions\/217"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sci-phi.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=40"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}Abstract
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